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4The Euro and its Impact
 on ASEAN Economies
Statement of the Problem
Since January 1, 1999, the euro era has begun. The new currency was
introduced for non-cash transaction in 11 European Union (EU) countries, and
euro notes and coins will be introduced in January 2002. The eleven
participating countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The currencies of these
countries will be irrevocably fused. The European Central Bank (ECB) is
supposed to become lord over monetary policy in Euroland.
The launching of the euro not only affects the 11 members of the
Euroland, but it also affects the potential new member countries such as Central
and Eastern European countries as well as some countries in Europe, Africa and
French territories such as Monaco, San Marino, Vatican, Andorra, Mayotte,
Saint Pierre, Miquelon, New Caledonia, and countries in West and Central
Africa’s single-currency zone. These countries will adopt the euro without
belonging to the Union. And if Sweden, Denmark, Greece and Britain join the
single currency, then their overseas territories would automatically adopt the
euro too (Table 1). The euro also influences third countries such as the United
States, Japan and developing Asian countries.
This article is based on a research carried out at the Institute of Agricultural
Policy and Market Research, University of Hohenheim-Stuttgart supported
financially by the Alexander von Humboldt foundation of Germany - Stuttgart. I
am indebted to Prof. W. Grosskopf for kind support.
5Table 1: Unofficially and Officially Euronized Countries as of January 2000
Unofficially euronized:
Some former French colonies in Africa, Balkans, Bosnia, Montenegro.
Officially euronized:
Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, Vatican City.
Source: CIA 1998; The Statesman’s Year-Book, IMF 1998, World Bank 1999.
Studies on the effects of the euro on economic growth, trade, and
investment have been carried out. The European Commission concludes that the
benefits of lower transaction and hedging costs are approximately amounted to
0.5% of GDP. The price transparency will increase competition among the
European firms. The stability of currency and expected low inflation will
increase intra-trade and enhance market efficiency. Moreover, the capital and
money markets will become more liquid and the cost of funding is expected to
be lower with improvement of the financial resource reallocation. The IMF
study also estimates the impact of the euro on economic growth based on the
percentage deviations from baseline scenario. The estimated results illustrate
that the participating countries are expected to grow much faster than the other
parts of the world (Table 2).
Table 2: Impact of EMU on Economic Growth (% deviations from baseline
scenario)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2010
EMU members 0.2 0.9 1.0 1.1 2.9
Non-European G7 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Other industrialized countries -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2
Developing countries 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
Source: IMF
Salvatore (1998) suggests that there are two main reasons supporting that
the euro could be a great challenge to the US dollar as an international currency.
First, it is highly expected that the invoicing currency will gradually shift toward
the euro. Second, the euro will play another role as an official reserve currency
(Table 3). However, McCauley (1997) argues that the appreciation of the euro
vis-a-vis the US dollar may not actually happen because there might be a net
portfolio shift between the international investment and borrowing in the
European financial market.
6The introduction of the euro will also affect both international trade and
investment. The impacts on international trade could lead to two directions:
trade diversion and trade creation. The trade creation is a higher amount of intra
EU trade and results in the economic growth in Euroland. However, increased
competitiveness of the firms in Euroland, market transparency, elimination of
the systematic risk and the lower cost of financing will lead to the trade
diversion effect.
Table 3: The Use of Currencies: EU, US and Japan
EU US Japan
World trade (1992) 31.0 48.0 5.0
World debt securities (1992) 34.5 37.2 17.0
Developing countries debt (end of 1996) 15.8 50.2 18.1
Foreign exchange transactions (1996) 35.0 41.5 12.0
Source: Salvatore (1998)
This paper looks at the conditions that will create euro’s dominance in
the ASEAN economies, and to what extent they will be threatened, or enhanced.
1. European Integration and the Euro
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in the early 1970s, the
global exchange rate system became unstable. European countries then devised
“the snake“ in April 1972. Participants of this system were required to fix their
currencies to fluctuate within a specific band. The snake consisted of Germany,
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Denmark. Bundesbank played an
important role as a leader of the system, which was often considered as the D-
mark block. In 1979, the snake was succeeded by the European Monetary
System (EMS) that consists of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and
European Currency Unit (ECU). The former was established as a mechanism to
control the fluctuation of the exchange rate and the latter was created to be a
synthetic basket of European currencies. Although the exchange-rate mechanism
of the EMS collapsed, the single market project was completed in 1992,
allowing for free flows of capital, labor, goods and services among member
countries (the Economist January 2,1999).
The process of creating the euro has taken for almost 30 years. Starting
with the Werner Plan in the early 1970s, has led to the success of the present
European Union. In 1986, the Single European Act was signed and entered into
7force in 1987. In 1989, Jacques Delors, President of the EC Commission,
reported on the creation of economic and monetary union (EMU) in three stages.
The first stage of the EMU started in July 1990, was the abolition of
capital control. During this stage, Maastricht treaty on European Union was
negotiated and signed in 1992 in order to form a process of moving toward the
single currency system.
The second stage began on January 1, 1994. The European Monetary
Institution (EMI) was created to supervise and make decision on the monetary
policy cooperation. Maastricht criterions were used to determine qualified
members of the single currency area. The criterions consist of a country’s
inflation and long term interest rates that represent the high degree of price
stability, the durability of convergence, the sustainability of the government
fiscal position and the exchange rate stability. As mentioned before, eleven
countries were accepted to be part of the Euroland whereas Britain, Denmark
and Sweden decided not to take part for this moment.
The final stage of the EMU was launched on January 1, 1999. The euro is
at first not a tangible currency but it is created for the accounting system and can
be used as a mean of payment as well as a store of value. Euro notes and coins
will be introduced in January 2002 and national currencies will be irrevocably
withdrawn. Most experts confidently predict that the euro will rise against the
dollar.
The EMI which eventually becomes the European Central Bank (ECB) is
clearer and more explicit than that of the Bundesbank (Deutschland,
December/January 1998). Its obligation is to determine interest rates and
regulate money supply in order to maintain price stability. The ECB will put its
trust in a money supply strategy, based on the Bundesbank model,
complemented by elements of direct inflation control. The highest decision-
making body of the Eurosystem is the Governing Council, which has 17
members; the six members of the Executive Board of the ECB and the 11
governors of the national central banks of the participating countries. Monetary
policy decisions are taken on the basis of one person, one vote. The monetary
policy discussions in the Governing Council are based on thorough and balanced
analytical input. The focus is clearly on developments in the euro area as a
whole. The Eurosystem is truly independent institution, completely devoted to
8its primary objective of achieving price stability, and with the power to take and
implement decisions efficiently.
After more than one year from the launch of the euro, it naturally
established itself as one of the world’s leading currencies. Given the size of the
euro area economy – comparable to that of the United States – it is only natural
that the euro has been popular as a currency for international bond issuance. EU-
dominated bonds accounted for more than 40% of the volume of new issues
during 1999, which is comparable to the market share of bonds dominated in the
US dollar. The gross issuance of corporate bonds denominated in euro increased
by almost 300% in 1999 compared with 1998. The increase was particularly
large for issues with a lower rating, for example issues with a Baa-rating
increased 500%, albeit from very low levels. The improved depth and width of
the euro area bond markets are important factors behind the large increase in
mergers and acquisitions in the euro area. In the longer run, this process is likely
to lead to improved competitiveness and higher growth potential for the euro
area as a whole.
Despite the euro’s popularity as a currency for bond issuance, many
economists have not yet witnessed a corresponding interest in the euro on the
investors’ side. This is probably one of the factors affecting the euro exchange
rate. There are reasons for investors’ cautious attitude to the euro. It is clear that
investors want to assess carefully both cyclical and structural developments in
the new currency area’s economies, its financial markets and overall economic
policies, before embracing the euro.
The limited attractiveness of investments in euro is most likely affected
by the still prevailing segmentation of the financial markets in Europe. In spite
of the rapid integration, there is still a long way to go until the financial markets
in the euro area become comparable with those in the United States as regards
depth, liquidity and the variety of instruments on offer. There are also many
uncertainties surrounding the structural developments and policies affecting the
future competitiveness of the euro area economies. Investors are wary of the fact
that progress on the implementation of necessary structural reform, notably in
order to improve labor market flexibility and with a view to improving the
functioning of social security and pension systems, is long overdue in most EU
Member States.
92. The Impact of the Euro on Macroeconomic Variables
Some economists including Canzoneri and Rogers (1990), Eichengreen
(1991), Rucci (1997) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) have carried out
studies of the European single currency area based on the concept of optimal
currency area suggested by Mundell (1961). The main question is whether it is
beneficial for the 11 countries to join the monetary union. The most popular
model which deals with this question measures the real divergence between
member countries (the degree to which the growth rates of output and
employment divert as a result of asymmetric shocks) against the degree of
flexibility of the labor markets and the interregional mobility of labor. The
reasoning behind this is that countries experiencing high degrees of real
divergence will need quite a bit of flexibility in labor institutions and labor
mobility. The studies conclude that the model of the European Monetary Union
is seriously flawed from an economic point of view. The degree of real
divergence exceeds the flexibility of labor institutions and the degree of
interregional labor mobility. EMU seems likely to remain a second-best option
at best.
The euro zone is not a region whose constituent parts are affected in
broadly the same way by typical economic disturbances, or among whose
constituent parts labor moves freely. Disparities in relative prices are greater
among the countries in the Euroland than among American states.
Europeans are so reluctant to move from one region to another, or even
one locality to another, in search of work. Even though every citizen of the
Union has the right to work or reside in another Member State, few actually
choose to do so. The OECD estimates that the number of EU nationals resident
in another Member State is only 5.5 million out of 370 million, equivalent to
1.5% of the population. The study also identifies a number of disincentives to
job mobility within the euro area. They include: a lack of information about job
opportunities in other regions, limited cross-border portability of social
protection and supplementary pension rights, a lack of comparability and
reciprocal recognition of professional qualifications and restrictions on public
sector employment.
As mentioned before, many studies of the benefits and the impacts of the
euro conclude that it will accelerate the growth of the 11 members of the
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Euroland, and the net impacts from both trade creation and trade diversion on
the non-EU countries will be positive. The argument is that there are major
concerns of Euroland. First, economic policy in the euro area as a whole will be
ill-judged, leading to a recession that discredits the whole venture. Second, the
system will prove too inflexible to cope with local economic shocks (or the
asymmetric shocks) because the business cycle of each country fluctuates in the
different patterns. To be consistent with the stability pact, it implies that
governments should aim for a structural deficit of 1% of GDP or less. The costs
would be large. Germany, for example, would need to raise taxes by more than
3% of GDP to keep its structural deficit at 1% of GDP between now and 2030
(Table 4).
Table 4: Tax Increases and Fiscal Targets, as % of GDP
A B C
Belgium 1.2 1.3 0.0
Finland 0.6 0.1 0.2
Germany 3.3 3.0 3.0
Italy -0.4 -0.3 -1.4
Netherlands 1.2 1.0 0.7
Spain 0.6 0.2 0.1
 Note: A = Holding budget dficit to 1% of GDP over cycle.
B = Reduce public debt to 60% of GDP by 2030.
C = Stabilize debt ratio at 1997 level.
Source: OECD
After more than one year from the launch of the euro, important
questions remain as to whether the benefits of the single currency in terms of
reduced uncertainty and transactions cost outweigh the potential costs of a “one
size fits all” monetary policy and exchange rate. As a contribution to this debate,
I have developed a series of EMU Convergence Indices (ECIs) that combine two
data sets concerning ten key macroeconomic indicators. The first set includes the
five variables used in the Maastricht criteria: inflation, long-term interest rates,
government debt and deficits and exchange rate volatility. The second set
includes five real and/or cyclical variables: annual GDP growth, the estimated
gap between actual and trend output, unemployment, the current account balance
and short-term interest rates.
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To begin with, I look at the relative convergence with the Euroland
average for the EU countries together with Norway, Switzerland, Hungary,
Poland and the Czech Republic based on latest available actual or estimated data
for 1999. As shown in Table 5, the results of this analysis confirm that Germany
and France represent the two key convergence benchmarks within Euroland.
These two large economies are followed by most of the other current
EMU members, with the notable exception of Ireland, which is by far the most
divergent of all the countries considered on real indicators and also now has the
highest inflation rate in Western Europe. Some of the other small or medium-
sized EMU countries, such as Spain, the Netherlands and Portugal, also show a
high degree of real divergence from the Euroland average at present, even
though they all score well against the Maastricht criteria. Interestingly, the UK is
the least convergent of the four EU countries currently outside EMU, although it
is not far behind Denmark and Greece. As would be expected, the non-EU
countries are generally the least convergent with Euroland at present.
I have also looked at changes in the EMU convergence rankings since
1992. Positive changes indicate higher convergence ranking in 1999 than in
1992.
As shown in Table 6, Germany has moved up 4 places in the ranking
from 5th in 1992 to1st in 1999. The temporary cyclical boom resulting from
German reunification meant that France was ranked first in the Euroland
convergence league table in 1992, with the newly-reunited Germany only fifth.
The fact that Germany was nonetheless still the anchor country in the ERM
contributed significantly to the problems experienced in 1992-93.
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Table 5: EMU Convergence Index, 1999
Rank <25 <50 >50 >100
1.Germany    x
2.France   x
3.Belgium    x
4.Austria    x
5.Spain    x
6.Sweden    x
7.Italy    x
8.Netherlands    x
9.Portugal    x
10.Greece    x
11.Denmark    x
12.UK    x
13.Finland    x
14,Switzerland    x
15.Czech Rep.    x
16.Norway    x
17.Ireland    x
18.Poland    x
19.Hungary    x
Source: own calculation
The Southern European countries have all moved strongly up the EMU
convergence league table since 1992, particularly on the Maastricht criteria. This
allowed Italy, Spain and Portugal to qualify for first wave EMU membership and
has enabled Greece to emerge as a strong candidate for EMU membership from
2001.
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Table 6: Changes in EMU Convergence Country Rankings
Positive Changes Negative Changes
Germany x
France x
Belgium x
Austria x
Spain x
Sweden x
Italy x
Netherlands x
Portugal x
Greece x
Denmark x
UK x
Finland x
Switzerland*
Norway x
Ireland x
Note: *=0
Source: own calculation
The position of Finland is particularly interesting in that it could also be a
model for some of the Central and Eastern European countries. In 1992, Finland
was still outside the EU and only just recovering from the collapse of the USSR,
with which they had very strong historic trading links. By 1999, Finland had not
only fully integrated into the EU and met the Maastricht criteria for first wave
EMU entry, but had moved up towards the middle of the league table on the real
convergence index, having been ranked last on this measure in 1992. In contrast,
Ireland’s exceptional economic performance has caused it to diverge ever further
from the Euroland average in terms of cyclical indicators.
Denmark and the UK, which were ranked in the top six of the
convergence league table in 1992  but chose to opt out of the first wave of EMU,
have become somewhat less convergent relative to the EMU participants. The
opposite appears to be true of Sweden, however, whose economic cycle has
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become more convergent with that of the large Euroland countries since the
early 1990s, despite not being in the first wave for EMU.
I have also observed that the euro area is experiencing a clear upturn in
economic activity. The ECB is now to ensure that this upturn is translated into a
protracted period of sustainable non-inflationary growth. In parallel with the
improved economic prospects, the balance of risks to future price stability has
gradually moved towards the upside. The prolonged deviation of monetary
growth from the Eurosystem’s reference value of 4.5% indicates that liquidity
conditions remain generous in the euro area. The strong rise in oil prices and the
downward movement of the euro exchange rate have put pressure on import and
producer prices. There is a need to ensure that these pressures do not feed into
lasting effects on consumer prices. These concerns prompted the Governing
Council to raise the Eurosystem’s policy interest rates consistently. However,
short-term interest rates in the euro area still remain at a very low level.
The analysis indicates that the use of a single currency will continue to
contribute to efficiency gains and increased welfare in the euro area as a whole.
One element which is crucial to this development is that the Eurosystem’s
monetary policy is firmly directed toward  price stability. However, the policy is
not the only factor affecting the prospects of the euro area economy. It is
essential that fiscal and structural policies are conducive to sustainable non-
inflationary growth. It is to note that in some of the smaller European
economies, which were badly hit by the economic crisis at the beginning of the
1990s, the adjustment, consolidation and liberalization processes have so far
been more rapid than in the larger economies of the euro area. The fact that the
larger economies are lagging behind in the implementation of structural reforms
is problematic. Moreover, it is clear that the current institutional and market
arrangements in the euro area are still far from optimal.
3. The Impact on the ASEAN Economies
Although the euro has been launched successfully, its exact impact on the
rest of the world and on ASEAN economies in particular is by no means certain.
It will depend on two related questions. The first one is whether euro will be
able to challenge the dollar as the world’s dominant reserve currency. The
second is what exactly will be the impact of the new European currency on
stability of the global monetary system.
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The EU’s 30% share of world output and 20% of world trade seem to
indicate its inevitable rise to a status of an important international currency.
However, the extent to which euro will be able to challenge dollar’s supremacy
is rather uncertain since a significant part of dollar’s international attractiveness
is the size, dept and liquidity of America’s capital markets. US market for
domestic securities, for example, is twice as large as the combined markets of all
EU countries, and the increasing European financial integration is unlikely to
challenge the supremacy in capital markets any time soon.
Most of the demand for euros will come from central banks, which may
choose to diversify their reserves gradually so as assets are shifted into euro. It
seems worthwhile to consider in more detail the possible reactions of both
European and non-European central banks. The total foreign-exchange reserves
of EU members currently amount to about $370 billion, excluding gold reserves.
After1999, European central banks’ need for holding reserves as a cushion to
meet temporary foreign currency shortages and as a means of supporting their
currencies  are reduced as the need to defend currencies against intra-European
volatility is eliminated. As the same time over 60% of trade will carried out in
euros. The average ratio of foreign-exchange reserves to imports in EU is
estimated to jump from 29% at present to 59%. As a result, central banks have
excess dollar reserves, which are most likely to be dumped in the markets. The
creation of a single European currency will boost the euro’s attractiveness as an
international currency for invoicing trade, as a tool of intervention and as an
investment. If the European Central Bank will be able to establish its inflation-
fighting credibility, there will be a strong case for non- European central bank to
hold more euros. For example, Japan’s foreign-exchange reserves are believed to
consist almost entirely of dollars, and thus in the long term it will be simply
prudent to diversify away from the greenback. The Chinese central bank also
announced it is planning to using more euros. About 60% of the Chinese $140
billion worth of reserves are currently held in US dollars against a mere 20% in
European currencies. In the near future a 40%-40% is said to be favored,
resulting in $28 billion dollars being sold to buy euros.
It is also expect d that some ASEAN countries whose currencies are
linked to US dollar will shift these links to the euro. As of January 2000,
ASEAN countries considered to have dollarization are Vietnam, Cambodia,
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Laos, Thailand and the Philippines. The dollarization occurs when residents of
these countries extensively use the US dollar alongside or instead of the
domestic currency. However, the euro can become a stronger rival to the dollar
as the foreign currency of choice in these countries.
Another impact of the single currency is likely to be in trade and
financial linkages. Increased activity and high import demand in the euro zone
will lead to increased exports from ASEAN economies. I use aggregate trade
data to attempt to assess the early effects of the euro on trade between Europe
and the ASEAN economies. The trade flows between the two regions between
1995-98 and 1999 are compared. The results are shown in Table 7. Although the
fraction of trade between the two regions has risen, a number of factors have
contributed to this result. Reduction of tariffs and alteration of exchange rate
policy during 1997 and 1998 due to financial crisis in ASEAN countries were
both important. Based on early returns, the impact of the euro over its first year
on trade between Euroland and ASEAN countries  does not appear to have been
large relative to the effects of these other events. Bekx (1998) may be right to
conclude that the net impacts from both trade directions on the third countries
will be positive.
Table 7: Changes in Net Trade Flows between Euroland and ASEAN countries,
1995-98 and 1999, %
Agriculture Manufacturing Services Average
Singapore  0.11 1.45 1.98 1.18
 Malaysia 1.22 1.48 1.11     1.27
Thailand 2.45 1.01 0.24 1.23
Philippines 1.11 0.98 0.55 0.88
Indonesia 1.45 1.04 0.99 1.16
ASEAN5 1.27 1.19 0.97 1.14
Source: Eurostat and own calculation
There also might be some investment by private institutions such as
insurance companies and pension funds in the euro zone that shift some of their
portfolios into ASEAN market investments. Because investments outside their
home countries but within the euro zone are reclassified as domestic currency
investments, investors may find that EMU effectively eases constraints imposed
by currency exposure requirements. ASEAN market economies could also
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benefit from direct and portfolio capital inflows if converging asset returns in
Europe lead global investors to increase their market holding in order to
diversify across countries. However, the effect is so far marginal.
There are, however,  some financial risks that ASEAN countries will now
be exposed to: a successful EMU that raises productivity and growth could make
Europe more attractive to investors and increase the cost of capital for ASEAN
economies. Furthermore, increased competitiveness of European financial
institutions and the greater depth of financial markets in the euro zone could lead
companies in ASEAN countries to raise capital in euro rather than in their
domestic currencies, thus challenging local capital market. This could, however,
provide an incentive for such countries to strengthen their financial
intermediation and build sound banking systems. I use micro data to attempt to
assess the early effects of the euro on multinational companies currently
operating in ASEAN countries. During January-February, 2000, about 87
companies are randomly classified as survey samples and asked to fill in the
questionnaire concerning their business impact and a re-appraisal of the product
and marketing strategy . As shown in Table 8, the effects are so far marginal.
Table 8: The Effects of the Euro on Business and Marketing Strategy, %
Yes No Don’t know
Payment systems 21.0 68.0 11.0
Trading and settlement 34.5 62.1 3.4
Risk management 27.4 57.4 15.2
Credit operations 42.8 25.7 31.5
Accounting 12.7 68.4 18.9
Re-appraisal of business strategies10.4 25.9 63.7
Source: own calculation
However, the euro and the environment it will create bring with it many
opportunities. At the same time there are many threats for the unprepared
economies and countries. The ASEAN government and businesses have come to
grips with the fact that the introduction of the euro is a global phenomenon with
global consequences and must be prepared to take advantage of the opportunities
and to mitigate the threats the euro poses. The challenge is for us to take actions
and launch initiatives to make us more competitive, as well as spur growth in our
region.
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5. Concluding Remarks
Aggregate and micro data between Euroland and ASEAN countries
suggest that the euro’s impact on ASEAN economies is marginal. Changes in
direct trade between ASEAN countries and the euro countries between 1995-98
and 1999 are relatively small. In the same way, the effects of the euro on
business and a re-appraisal of the product and marketing strategy of
multinational companies currently operating in ASEAN countries are small.
Moreover, most local currencies in ASEAN countries continue to at least
benchmark their currencies against the US dollar, making the greenback the
dominant currency in their central bank reserves. However, it might be too early
to give a concrete conclusion.
Not only the 11 European countries that unified their currencies on
January, 1999, but the process of euronization will include Central and East
European countries as well as some countries in Europe, Africa and the French
territories. These countries will officially or simiofficially or unofficially tie their
currencies to the euro, and some of them will peg their currencies to a basket
which will give a significant weighting to the euro. If all these countries are
included, euro-related countries will receive more than 20% of ASEAN exports.
With the advent of the euro will also come reductions in currency risk and other
transaction costs, which should strengthen trade relations between ASEAN
countries and Europe. Many suppliers from ASEAN countries may have to
invoice their European customers in euros, thus further enforcing the euro
influence in the region.
Moreover, Europe also remain the largest supplier of bank capital to
ASEAN countries. The latest available information of external bank debt
provided by the Bank for International Settlements indicates that 34% of bank
loans that ASEAN countries had received in 1997 had come from EMU
countries. The EU as a whole accounted for 43% of the loans, compared to 30%
from Japan, and about 8% from the United States.
European capital markets are integrating and liquidity is increasing. This
leads to more lending to ASEAN countries when the situation stabilizes. Even if
ASEAN countries end up relying less on bank borrowing once they have
recovered from economic crisis, European banks will still be the leading lenders
to the region. There will also be an increase in capital-markets financing.
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All this future capital outflow from Europe to ASEAN countries is more
likely to be denominated in euros. An imminent problem for companies in
ASEAN countries of servicing loans in euros is currency risk, which means that
they will keep a close eye on their euro reserves for currency matching purpose.
More important is Europe’s position as a major supplier of new technology to
ASEAN countries. With further economic integration, high-tech companies will
consolidate in Europe and then expand strategically outside. They might try
ASEAN countries because of their national resources, cheap labor and AFTA
scheme.
Lastly, the demand for euros by governments of ASEAN countries is also
likely to increase gradually. The dollar remains the major official reserve
currency in the region, although its dominance has weakened. In the ASEAN
region, the euro may well challenge the yen and become the second major
reserve currency.
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